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Congressional Investigations:

A Plan for Legislative Review
by Frank E. Horack, Jr. • Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law

m As Lloyd K. Garrison pointed out in an article in last month's Journal, congressional investigations have served the country well and we could not do without
them, while at the same time some of them occasionally develop excesses which
cause their friends both in and out of Congress much concern. Mr. Garrison's
article offered some suggestions for getting off the horns of the dilemma; Professor Horack offers here his own suggestion for solving the problem: a Committee
in each house of Congress to review witnesses' claims of exemption from giving
testimony.

Moreover, the relevance and materiality of the subject matter must be
presumed. .

.

. It would be intoler-

able if the judiciary were to intrude
into the legislative branch of the
Government and virtually stop the
process of investigation."0
The Supreme Court, however,
underltook

judicial review of con-

gressional committee procedure in
m Although the great majority of
congressional hearings and investigations are conducted with fairness
and decorum, a few committees have
placed in jeopardy the reputations,
dignity and constitutional rights of
many persons who have been summoned as witnesses. As a consequence, there has been an insistent
demand for limiting the jurisdiction
of committee investigations and reviewing the fairness of committee
procedure. Some critics have looked
to the courts for a revitalization of
Kilbourn v. Thompson1 and others
have proposed enactment of uniform
rules for congressional committee
procedure.2 Neither approach offers
a complete solution.
Two propositions are self-evident:
witnesses should be protected from
"fishing expeditions", inquiry into
purely private affairs and from enforced testimony which might in
criminate; the Government should
have the full knowledge, testimony
and opinion of all its citizens concerning matters of great national im3
port. Only with the aid of the citi-

zens may Congress discharge what
Woodrow Wilson described as the

Christoflel v. United States7 even

duty "to look diligently into every
affair of government and to talk
much about what it sees". 4 And if
Congress is intended to be the watchdog for the people and "the informing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative function",5 then Congress, not the courts,
should determine the limits of
its jurisdiction when constitutional
guarantees are not involved.
Until recently, the judiciary has
respected and reflected Wilson's view
and has been reluctant to interfere
with the investigating process, for,
as Judge Holtzoff observed, "While
the power of Congress to carry on
investigations is not without limit,
nevertheless the Congress has broad
discretion in determining the subject
matter of the study and the scope and
extent of the inquiry. If the subject
under scrutiny may have any possible
relevance and materiality, no matter
how remote, to some possible legislation, it is within the power of the
Congress to investigate the matter.

experiment in United States v. Bry -

though it soon chose to abandon the
an. s But late in the last term, in

United States v. Rumely9 the Court

more boldly restrained committee inquiry even though the decision rested
upon the shifting sands of inconclusive statutory construction.' 0 Nevertheless, the recent decisions stand as
an unmasked warning to congressional committees and will invite further
I. 103 U.S. 168 [1880).
2. Most of the proposals have been collected
in Glossle and Cooley, "Congressional Investigations-Slvation in Self-Regulation", 38 Geo. L. J.
343 (1950); see also, "Symposium-Congressional
Investigations", 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 421-686
(1951); Wyzanski, "Standards of Congressional
Investigations", 3 Record 93 (1947).
3, Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation", 40 Harv.
f. Rev. 153 (1926).
4, Wilson, Congressiona Government 303.
5. ibid.
6. United States v. Bryan, 72 F, Supp. 58 11947).
7. 338 U.S. 84 (19491.
8, 339 U.S. 323 (1950),
9, 73 S. Ct. 543 (1953),
10. The resolution authorized the committee to
investigate "lobbying activities". A subpoena
issued to procure information concerning "indirect
lobbying" was held beyond the jurisdiction of the
committee because dictionary definitions of lobbying were retrictud to "direct lobbying".
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challenges to committee power.
Whether the challenges are meritorious or not, the congressional ability
to discharge its informing function
has been seriously encumbered.
The protection of civil rights, of
admitted concern throughout these
litigations and certainly of the highest value in our constitutional system,
does not require judicial review of
internal congressional procedure nor
jurisdictional limitation on committee inquiry. Judicial review will not
only result in a reduction in the
power of Congress but also in a decline in congressional responsibility.
And the courts' inquiry cannot be
easily confined to the cases of "legislative" investigations: no logical
boundary separates investigation of
the administration of the Government, investigation under the treaty
power, impeachments, confirmations
of appointments, and even memberdiscipline and the review of elections.
Judicial review of all these diverse
subjects would present many embarrassing political questions and a
gradual withdrawal of judicial review similar to that which followed
Kilbourne v. Thompson" might be
predicted.
Uniform Rules
Have Three Weaknesses
Thus, the great majority of writers
have opposed an expansion of judicial review and argue that Congress
should assume full responsibility for
supervising committee action by enacting uniform rules of procedure
binding upon all standing and select
committees. The adoption of uniform rules may contribute to an improvement in committee procedure,
but basically they suffer from three
weaknesses: (1) Different committees
have widely differing responsibilities
and thus a sensible rule for one may
be utter folly for another. (2) The
enactment of uniform rules is no
guarantee that the committees will
comply. Good committees can make
good rules, but good rules cannot
make good committees. And (3) they
provide no sanctions for their enforcement.
The real need is for a system of
192
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legislative review to enforce uniform
rules and insure fairness and responsibility of investigations. Theoretically, this is possible now by any
member of the House moving to
rescind the committee's authority or
to confine it by restrictive amendment, but politically it is impossible.
The only way the issue reaches the
floor of the House is for a witness to
refuse to testify and for the committee to seek a resolution from the
House for his prosecution either before the bar of the House or in the
federal courts.
When the issue is raised in this
manner it does not present the question of whether the committee has
exceeded its authority or whether
the questions have been relevant and
material, but whether the chairman
of the committee is entitled to a vote
of confidence from his party and
from the House. The witness is unrepresented and his cause is soon
forgotten. Congressmen who privately condemn the actions of the
committee feel compelled to vote in
support of the committee because
the party leadership insists that a
vote of confidence is essential to
maintain the party position, and individual members, regardless of the
merits of the particular controversy,
feel that a negative vote would jeopardize their own positions as committee chairmen. Uniform rules will
not repeal congressional courtesy.
The philosophy of McGrain v.
Daugherty12 can be maintained and
judicial review avoided if the Houses
establish a system of legislative review. The proposal would permit a
witness to challenge the authority of
an investigating committee by an
appeal to a review committee appointed by the House. The committee should be bipartisan in character,
composed of three members from
each major political party. The members should be selected from the lawyer members and should have extensive legislative experience and be
held in high personal and professional respect by both sides of the
House. In addition to the six members there should be a panel of alternates from which members can be

selected in case an appeal is taken
from a committee which includes a
13
review committee member.
A committee witness should not be
permitted to challenge the sufficiency
of the subpoena before the review
committee prior to his appearance
before the investigating committee,
for the presumption should be in
favor of the propriety of the inquiry and the witness' obligation to
provide information to the Government. After appearance, however,
the witness should be able to challenge the propriety of specific ques
tions on the ground that (1) the
inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by the House resolution or
the terms of the subpoena, (2) the
question is not material or relevant
to the inquiry,14 or (3) the question
invades the witness' constitutional
rights. Challenge of committee authority would be raised as it is now
by the witness' refusing to answer.
In addition, the witness would be
required to indicate his intent to
appeal to the review committee.
Thereafter, the investigating committee could not seek a resolution
authorizing prosecution for contempt
until after the review committee
handed down its decision.
The witness would be obligated to
notify the review committee of an
appeal by the second day following
the day on which the question was
asked. 15 The appeal would be on the
record, that is, a verified copy of the
resolution authorizing the inquiry,
the subpoena, if one had been used,
and the verbatim transcript of the
pertinent questions asked by the
committee. In order to prevent delay
and discursive dilatory tactics, the
committee should have the right to
ask all questions which it considered
pertinent to its inquiry and the wit11. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
12. 273 U.S. 135 (1926).
13. Admittedly, personnel of this caliber will
be already overburdened with responsibility, but
with staff-aides of Supreme Court clerk ability,
they should be able to discharge these additional
obligations.
14. On legislative review, the issue of muteriality
and relevance should be much broader than in
judicial review. See, infra page 194.
15. When the investignting committee is holding
hearings outside of Washington, the time for
notifying would, of course, have to be lengthened.
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ness should be obligated to raise all
his objections at one time so that
the entire matter might be disposed of on one appeal. 16
in support of the appeal, the witness and the committee should be
permitted to file written briefs, inasmuch as the matter in controversy
usually will be known to the witness
and the committee in advance of the
hearing, a ten-day briefing period
should be sufficient. In cases of unusual difficulty the review committee, in the same manner as a court,
should have the power to extend the
time for filing. Reply briefs and oral
argument should be discouraged but
not prohibited. The psychological
advantage of assuring the witness
that his case has actually been heard
by the review committee should outweigh the burdens which oral arguments impose on the review comittee and the delays to the conduct of
the investigation.
Within as short a period as possible
after the conclusion of arguments
the review committee should be obligated to render its decision, in order
that the investigation may proceed
if the decision is favorable to the
committee, and that the witness'
position may be speedily confirmed if
the decision is against the committee.
The decision of the review committee
should be accompanied by a written
opinion. Copies of the opinion
should be available immediately to
the witness and to the committee,
and in order that a body of precedents may be developed the opinions
should ultimately be printed and
published.
It Is To Be Hoped That Few Witnesses
Would Remain Recusant
If the decision of the review committee sustains the investigating committee, the witness could be recalled
under the original subpoena merely
by informing the witness of a new
date set for the hearing. If the witness continued recusant, the coinmittee could then move for a house
resolution authorizing prosecution
for contempt. Although the vote on
this motion would in effect amount
to a reconsideration by the whole

House of the review committee's
decision, unless there had been a
vigorous dissent by a review committee member the adoption of the
resolution would be in most instances
automatic. It is to be hoped, of
course, that in these circumstances
few witnesses would remain recusant.
If the review committee proceeds in
an impartial and judicial manner,
courts should give great weight to
its determinations particularly where
they relate to matters of jurisdiction
or internal committee procedure.
Witnesses should, therefore, be less
successful in their judicial appeals
and should conclude that the expenditure of time and money will
17
gain them little.
Conversely, if the decision is
against the investigating committee,
the witness should not only feel vindicated but should also be protected
against further harassment. Congress
in the enabling legislation could
grant complete finality to the decision, i.e., make a subsequent resolution based on the matter at issue out
of order, place the members of the
committee in contempt if they procccded with the questions, or make a
continuation of the inquiry grounds
for the withdrawal of the committee's
authority. The severity of these sanctions and the fact that enforcement
would raise a political question for
the entire membership to decide
argues against complete finality to
the review committee's decision. Furthermore, formal abdication of the
authority of the house is not in
keeping with legislative practice.
A second possibility would be to
give finality to the decision unless it
was appealed by the investigating
committee for reconsideration by the
whole house. This appears to be a
needless step and tends to reintroduce political considerations which
the review procedure seeks to eliminate. A better procedure would permit the decision to be attacked collaterally.
Under this third proposal, if, after
an adverse decision, the investigating
committee recalls the witness and
the witness again refuses to answer,
the committee may seek a resolution

Frank E. Horack, Jr., has been a professor of law at Indiana University since
1935. A graduate of the University of
Iowa, he was admitted to the Iowa Bar
in 1929. He is the author of a number of
books and law review articles.

authorizing a prosecution for contempt. In effect this action challenges
the decision of the review committee
not in an abstract way, as in the second situation, but within the framework of an actual litigation. Presumptively, the decision of the review
committee, because it is rendered by
an impartial tribunal not concerned
with the inquiry, should prevail. The
house will be aware that a court
would more likely, in deciding a contempt prosecution, follow the decision of tIre independent committee
than of the prosecuting committee;
therefore, the house, when it must
choose between the decisions of the
two committees, is likely to accept
the review committee's verdict.
Perhaps the greatest merit to the
procedure is that it keeps the issues
narrow and balances political pressures. The issue will not be: Should
we support our appointed committee
against the attack of a nonmember?
16. This does not imply, however, that after a
notice to the review committee has been issued,
the hearing committee cannot withdraw the question or the witness indicate his willingness to
answer thereby making the appeal moot.
17. It is conceivable, if the legislative review
proved to be a highly reliable process, that witnesses ofter an adverse decision by the review
committee might more frequently receive maximum
fines and imprisonment upon their conviction in
court.
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or, Will an adverse vote injure the
political position of the majority
party? The issue framed under this
proposal will be: Which of two committees has more accurately determined the propriety of a particular
question asked of a particular witness under a specific resolution authorizing an inquiry? On such a
question, reasonable men admittedly
may differ, but the decision of the
house is now more easily confined
to the merits of the question and the
political pressures are now balanced,
for the decision of one committee
must be sustained and the decision
of the other must be reversed.
There are other advantages of legislative review. When the question is
decided judicially, concepts of separation of powers and intergovernmental relations must be considered
by the court. Is it wise and proper,
therefore, for the court to review the
internal workings of a legislative
committee unless compelled by constitutional direction? If the court
interferes will it encourage witnesses,
without cause, to delay investigations
necessary to the national security
and welfare? If the court refuses to
interfere, will this be interpreted by
congressional committees as carte
blanche authority to proceed without
restraint? These questions need not
perturb the legislative review committee. They are a part of the legislative process and may police the
committees with a view to maintaining the reliability and insuring the
public respect and confidence in the
fairness and impartiality of legislative investigations.
When a court decides issues of
"relevancy and materiality" it must
limit its decisions to jurisdictional
constitutional questions. The legislative review committee, however, can
consider not only the jurisdictional
and constitutional questions but also
the import of specific questions on
the total conduct of the hearing. If,
for example, the house adopts rules

194
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for the governance of committee
hearings and investigations similar
18
to those which have been proposed,
the review committee could restrain
the investigating committee from
asking questions concerning personal
and private belief, from inquiring
into matters adversely affecting reputation without insuring the witness
the opportunity of filing a sworn
statement in refutation, or from requiring testimony without the presence of counsel. These are but a few
of the safeguards suggested in the
uniform rules, but practically all of
them are susceptible to better enforcement by the legislative review
committee than by the courts.
Courts Cannot Easily Protect

both to the witness and to the government. The witness can get an early
determination of his case with a
lesser expenditure of time and money. This is not an inconsequential
advantage, for the risk of criminal
prosecution with all its implications
and insinuations has no doubt forced
more than one witness to testify when
he was in fact privileged.
The advantages to Congress will
also be great. The four or five years'
delay required by the current method
of prosecution for contempt will be
eliminated in the majority of cases.
The Government, if it is entitled to
it, will have the advantage of impor
tant testimony when it needs it most.
T he spectacle of a willful witness
stopping the machinery of governCongressional Witnesses
ment should become rare, for if
The courts have no convenient way legislative review is impartial and
by which to restrain a committee competent, such a witness can foresee
from establishing "guilt by associa- slight chance of acquittal if the retion", from disparaging and "con- view committee decides adversely in
victing" unfriendly witnesses or from his case. Conversely, legislative iereleasing partial and misleading view should insure fairer treatment
transcripts of evidence. Legislative of all witnesses and to that extent
review, however, could properly pro- most witnesses should be willing to
vide this type of supervision. The testify more freely. Finally, the inhouse, through the review commit- vestigating function should be made
tee, could protect its own record and a responsible process and thereby be
maintain proper responsibility to its relieved of the charges of bias and
constituents.
prejudice.
Decisions of this character are adAdmittedly, legislative review will
mittedly difficult to make and for cause an initial increase in the numobvious reasons no legislator would
ber of cases, but if the procedure is
make them voluntarily. Thus, a legis- well administered the increase will
lative procedure which requires the be temporary. Soon the investigating
witness to raise the issue and imposes committees will recognize the limits
by statute the duty of deciding on
of their own power, and witnesses
the review committee, not only ap- will learn that spurious objections
peals to the lawyers' respect for re- will not be sustained. Ultimately,
view procedure, but also is politically only the meritorious borderline cases
attractive because the review con- where reasonable men differ will be
itittee is not required to take the
litigated.
initiative and the membership of
Legislative review will fill the
the house need not xote on broad hiatus between unenforceable rules
and inarticulate political issues. Each
of committee procedure and undesirdecision, as at common law, will be able judicial intervention in the
trade on the narrow facts of the par- legislative process.
ticular case.
18. See supro, note 2.
This procedure offers advantages

